- Automated Commercial Environment Export Reports… What’s New?
- Failing to Keep Current with Classifications Leads to Civil Penalty for NJ-based Company
- US Citizen CEO Sentenced to 57 Months in Prison for Conspiring to Export Specialty Metals to Iran
Automated Commercial Environment Export Reports… What’s New?
(Source: Global Reach Blog)
With more than 128,000 Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) export reports run since deployment mid-2015 and more than 6,762 reports run during the month of June 2017 alone, it’s evident that the trade community is using the export reports feature in ACE, and its popularity is ever increasing.
Customer feedback continues to shape the way we do business. The following examples help illustrate the updates prompted and informed by such customer feedback:
- The available data elements have been updated to include the Country of Ultimate Destination.
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) created 11 short topic-based export reports training videos available in the ACE Portal and on the CBP website.
- A webinar and Q&A on ACE Export Reports was conducted in mid-December 2016 and subsequently an updated version of that webinar that was conducted in July 2017 and may be viewed online now for on-demand viewing and training needs.
- The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking effective in July 2017 added additional data elements (the Internal Transaction Number, filer name and date of export) to the AES 203 (Agent-Filed Routed) Report to make this report useful. This data is now also searchable by filing date and export date.
These are just a few of the ways that you’ve helped us more effectively help you. We realize that users are exploring the export reports feature in ACE. We want to empower our users to utilize all of the available functionality.
And, here are just a few reminders:
- The three available reports include: AES 201 (Filer), AES 202 U.S. Principal Party in Interest (USPPI) and AES 203 (Agent-Filed Routed).
- The AES 201 and AES 202 will initially return a smaller universe of data elements (25). Learn how to add or remove data elements by watching the “Modifying Report Queries” video available on the CBP Export Reports resource page and in the Training Resources area in the ACE Portal.
- The AES 203 report will only return the handful of data elements that are authorized by the Foreign Trade Regulations. ACE Importer accounts automatically have access to export reports for Employer Identification Numbers (EINs) already vetted by CBP on the import side. ACE Exporter accounts must be vetted by the U.S. Census Bureau.
Exporters are able to run comprehensive reports based on their EIN and review the Electronic Export Information that has been filed internally and externally. Authorized agents are able to run reports across the universe of filings they have transmitted, as well as run individual reports at the client level. The benefits of having this type of on-demand access is revolutionary to the export compliance landscape and gives the trade community a powerful auditing capability. We highly recommend that you obtain authorization to access reports if you have not done so already, and if you have access, to explore the functionality that is available to you.
Until the next update, happy reporting!
P.S. There is even a “Late Filing Indicator” data element that can be added to customized reports … how beneficial is that to your compliance pursuit?
Failing to Keep Current with Classifications Leads to Civil Penalty for NJ-based Company
By: Ashleigh Foor
During the second week of September, Bright Lights USA, a Barrington, NJ-based company, received a $400,000 civil penalty from the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) for exporting unauthorized defense components and technical data, which violates the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Bright Lights notified DDTC of two ITAR violations in voluntary self-disclosures filed with the agency in April 2013 and June 2016.
Bright Lights failed to stay current with the former Obama administration’s Export Control Reform (ECR) regarding the transition of ITAR-related commodities/technology from the State Department’s US Munitions List to the Commerce Control List. The wrong commodity jurisdiction was selected and resulted in export violations for both the physical export of the items and the illegal transfer of technology made by the company.
Want to make sure your company is staying compliant? We have an upcoming webinar on classifications:
Practice Makes Perfect—A Two-Part Webinar that Combines Hands-On Exercises, Discussions, and Instruction. October 25, 2017 & November 8, 2017
US Citizen CEO Sentenced to 57 Months in Prison for Conspiring to Export Specialty Metals to Iran
By: Ashleigh Foor
On Friday, September 8, 2017, Erdal Kuyumcu, a US citizen and the chief executive officer of Global Metallurgy, LLC, based in Woodside, New York, was sentenced to 57 months in prison for conspiring to export specialty metals to Iran. The sentencing took place at the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, New York and proceedings held before Chief United States District Judge Dora L. Irizarry. In June 14, 2016, Kuyumcu plead guilty to conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act by exporting specialty metals from the United States to Iran.
According to court documents, Kuyumcu conspired to export from the United States to Iran a metallic powder primarily composed of cobalt and nickel, without having obtained the required license from the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). It was determined after a two-day presentencing evidentiary hearing that the metallic powder has potential military and nuclear uses. In order to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the US Department of Commerce requires a license to export and exporting without the required license is illegal.
In addition, Kuyumcu and others planned to obtain more than 1,000 pounds of the metallic powder from a US-based supplier, and hid the true destination of the goods by having it shipped first to Turkey and then to Iran. Coded language was used to keep this all secret, for instance, referring to Iran as the “neighbor.” Once a shipment was sent from Turkey to Iran, a steel company in Iran would send a letter-sized package to Kuyumcu’s Turkey-based co-conspirator.
The Iranian steel company had the same address as an OFAC-designated Iranian entity under the Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferators’ sanctions program that was associated with Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.