Archive for the ‘Russia’ Category

Sanctions in Name Only Imposed on Russia for Nerve Gas Attack

2018/08/30

(Source: Export Law Blog, 8 Aug 2018. Reprinted by permission.)

By: R. Clifton Burns, Esq., Bryan Cave LLP, Washington DC, Clif.Burns@bryancave.com, 202-508-6067.

Clif Burns, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, Washington, DC. Copyright Clif Burns 2018

According to a State Department press release released today, the United States has made a determination that Russia used novichok, a chemical warfare agent, in an attack on British soil and, as a result, the US will impose sanctions on Russia under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (the “CBWC Act”), 22 U.S.C. § 5601 et seq.  The text of these sanctions was not released.  Instead, the text will be in a Federal Register notice expected to be published on or around August 22.  The sanctions will be effective as of the date of the publication of that notice.

Because these sanctions are being imposed under the CBWC Act, we can already get a good idea of what these sanctions will be.   The Act contemplates sanctions being imposed in two stages.  The first stage, described in section 5605(a), sets forth the following sanctions, all of which are required to be imposed upon the offending country:

  • Termination of all foreign assistance
  • Termination of all arms sales
  • Termination of all foreign military financing
  • Denial of U.S. government credit or assistance
  • Termination of all exports of items controlled on the Commerce Control List for NS reasons

To be honest, none of these sanctions will have any significant impact on Russia.  Arms sales to Russia have been prohibited for some time now.   The country chart already has Russia controlled for both columns of NS controls.  Of course, you could say that the new sanctions will mean that NS items will not be considered for licenses under any circumstances.  But I don’t think licenses to export NS items to Russia are being readily granted now.

The second stage, if it happens, would take place on November 8 of this year unless the President determines that Russia is no longer using chemical or biological weapons.  If that determination is not made, the President is required to impose three sanctions from a set of six possible sanctions.  Those six possible sanctions are:

  • Opposing multilateral bank financial assistance to Russia
  • Prohibition of U.S. bank loans to the government of Russia
  • Prohibition of all exports of all U.S. goods and technology to Russia
  • Downgrading or suspending diplomatic relations with Russia
  • Termination of all service to and from the United States by Russian airlines

Whether the President will make the findings necessary to impose this second stage and which three of the six will be imposed is anyone’s guess, although I suspect that most people likely have a pretty good guess.   The upcoming Federal Register notice will probably not even address the second stage sanctions.   If the United States does in fact impose the three second stage sanctions, the best guess is probably that he will impose the least restrictive of those, i.e., opposing multilateral bank loans, prohibiting U.S. bank loans, and expelling a few more diplomats.

 


Company Fined $155,000 for Screening Related Violations

2018/08/30

By: Danielle Hatch

Mohawk Global Logistics Corp. has been fined $155,000 for 3 violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) related to exporting to companies on the Entity List.

Around August 2012 Mowhawk exported an LNP-20 Liquid Nitrogen Plant (EAR99 and valued at $33,587) to the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF). The company had a screening process in place and when they screened VNIIEF they got a hit and the shipment was initially flagged. During the BIS investigation Mowhawk acknowledged that the export supervisor accidently overrode (or ignored) the red flag and the shipment was processed. Mowhawk filed EEI and listed the shipment as No License Required (NLR) which would have been accurate had the end user not been on the Entity List. Since VNIIEF is a denied party a license is always required to export any items subject to the EAR. This was the 1st of 3 total charges.

In February 2014 and August 2015, Mokhawk once again exported to an organization on the Entity List, but this time they were in China. The company exported Real-Time Back Reflection Laue Camera Detectors and Accessories (EAR99 and valued at $177,156) to the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC). Once again, Mowhawk used screening software, but this time it failed to flag the transaction because Mowhawk didn’t screen UESTC’s full, unabbreviated name. This could be a common mistake, however, all of the documents that UESTC provided to Mowhawk clearly identified UESTC’s full name as it was listed on the Entity List along with an almost exact matching address. The shipment was processed in February 2014 and they filed EEI as NLR. As with the first charge, had the export not gone to someone on the Entity List a license likely would not have been required.

In August 2015 Mowhawk exported the same exact items to UESTC after they had been returned for warranty repair. This time, Mowhawk didn’t screen the transaction at all using their screening software and there was no EEI filed in connection with this particular export to UESTC. These transactions were charges 2 and 3.

Settlement Agreement:

  • Pay $135,000 in 3 separate payments
  • Payment of the remaining $20,000 is suspended as long as the company pays the $135,000 on time.
  • If payments are not received on time, BIS may issue an order denying all of Mowhawk’s export privileges
  • Mowhawk can’t take any action or make any public statement denying the allegations in the BIS Charging Letter or Order

Order and Charging Letter: https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2018/1193-e2561/file


Strict Export Regulations May Be Costing Us Industry Billions in Foreign Sales

2018/07/30

(Source: Defense News, 18 June 2018.)

A new RAND report (a source for research on policy ideas and analysis) studying the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles suggests that the current export controls for drones might be hurting the US more than helping.

US competitors like China and Russia are filling the void that has been left by the limitation on US drone exports in markets like the Middle East where the US historically dominated in sales. Over the past several years, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) were denied requests to buy American drones, and have since turned to China to purchase similar systems. The Trump administration recently revealed a new set of export policies concerning military technology in an attempt to facilitate the transfer of military technology, but the changes do not change the status of drones under the Missile Technology Control Regime.

How does the MTCR work?

The MTCR is a voluntary export control group of 35 nations who collaborate to prevent signatories from proliferating longer-range cruise and ballistic missile technology. The arms control regime was extended to UAVs because early iterations of drones were considered a subset of cruise missile technology due to their active guidance system.

The regime divides missiles into two categories. This article will cover Category I.

Category I:

  • Capable of delivering a 500 kg payload more than 300 km
  • Sale of category I systems is restricted by a “strong presumption of denial” (meaning they are only exported in rare circumstances)
  • MQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-4 Triton are well-known unmanned systems that fall under this category

Drone proliferation

RAND found that 10 nations use category I drones, and more than 15 use near-category I systems that register just below the MTCR’s payload and distance restrictions. The report states that these increased proliferation rates are due to countries like China, Israel, and the UAE who are not part of the MCTR. More countries are expected to follow suit which will cause a “growing threat to U.S. and allied military operations,” the report says.

While category I systems can deploy missiles, their main threat lies in “their ability to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations against U.S. forces prior to hostilities,” according to RAND. “Adversaries that would otherwise have difficulty detecting U.S. force deployments, monitoring U.S. operations, and maintaining targeting data on U.S. units can employ UAVs to maintain situational awareness of U.S. capabilities.”

The report identifies Russia, China, and Iran as unfriendly nations that will try to utilize drones to complicate US military operations.

A US-sized hole

Due to restrictions on US drone exports, competitors have established themselves in a market Rand expects to “grow from about $6 billion in 2015 to about $12 billion in 2025.”

“What you are enabling the competition to do is not just to sell some hardware,” Linden Blue, General Atomic’s chief executive, told reporters during an Aug. 16, 2017 roundtable at the company’s headquarters in Poway, California. “You’re enabling it to build a customer base for at least 20 years, I would say. You’re enabling them to build a logistics system. It will take them many years to get to where we are right now, but you’re helping them start out. They should be very thankful.”

Details: https://www.defensenews.com/newsletters/unmanned-systems/2018/06/18/strict-export-regulations-may-be-costing-us-industry-billions-in-foreign-sales/


Trilogy International Associates, Inc. and William Michael Johnson Each Receives $100,000 Civil Penalty for Export Violations

2018/04/04

By: Ashleigh Foor

On or about January 23, 2010, April 6, 2010, and May 14, 2010, Trilogy International Associates, Inc., of Altaville, CA exported an explosives detector and a total of 115 analog-to-digital converters to Russia. These items are subject to the EAR and controlled on national security grounds. The items were classified under Export Control Classification Numbers 1A004 and 3A001, respectively, and valued in total at approximately $76,035. Each of the items required a license for export to Russia pursuant to Section 742.4 of the EAR.

Between, on, or about January 20, 2010 and May 14, 2010, William Michael Johnson of Angels Camp, CA, caused, aided, and/or abetted three violations of the EAR, specifically three exports from the United States to Russia of items subject to the EAR without the required BIS export licenses.

Charges include:

  • Three Charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a) – Engaging in Prohibited Conduct
  • Three charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(b) – Causing, Aiding, or Abetting a Violation

Penalty:

  • Civil penalty of $100,000 against Trilogy International Associates, Inc.
  • Civil penalty of $100,000 against William Michael Johnson
  • Debarred: Both Trilogy International Associates, Inc. and William Michael Johnson are denied export privileges for a period of 10 years from the date of this Order, until 26 February 2028.

Date of Order: 26 February 2018


Miltech, Inc. of Northampton, MA Receives 18 Charges of Alleged Export Violations

2017/11/15

By: Ashleigh Foor

On September 25, 2017, Miltech, Inc. of Northampton, MA was charged a civil penalty of $230,000 due to engaging in conduct prohibited by the EAR when it exported items subject to the EAR from the United States to China and Russia without the required BIS Licenses. On eighteen separate occasions between, on, or around October 14, 2011 and July 14, 2014, Miltech exported active multiplier chains, items classified under Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 3A001.b.4 and valued in total at approximately $364,947, without seeking or obtaining the licenses required for these exports pursuant to section 742.4 of the EAR. These items are controlled on national security and anti-terrorism grounds.

Miltech received 18 charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a) for engaging in prohibited conduct. $180,000 of the $230,000 penalty must be paid within 30 days, and the remaining $50,000 will be suspended and waived after two years if Miltech fulfills the terms of its settlement agreement and this order.  The company will not be debarred if penalty is paid as agreed and Miltech complies with other terms of this settlement.


Russia Will Struggle to Turn on Siemens Turbines in Sanctions-Bound Crimea

2017/08/03

(Source: Reuters, 19 July 2017.)

MOSCOW (Reuters) – Russia outfoxed European Union sanctions by delivering gas turbines made by Germany’s Siemens to the annexed Ukrainian region of Crimea. Now for the hard part, switching them on.

No Russian company, according to Reuters data, has ever got a Siemens turbine working without the help of the manufacturer.

In this case, Siemens said the turbines were shipped to Crimea behind its back and is refusing to be involved, leaving Moscow to work out how to start them up to fulfill President Vladimir Putin’s promise to give Crimea a stable power supply.

Siemens has filed a lawsuit against its Russian customer over the delivery of the turbines to Crimea and says it will do everything in its power to block their installation and commissioning.

If Russia can somehow get the turbines operating at the two new power plants under construction, having already irked Europe by delivering them, it will again demonstrate its ability to thumb its nose at the sanctions.

Ten industry specialists who spoke to Reuters said starting up the turbines without engineers from Siemens or its partners would be a tough test of the country’s engineering resourcefulness, fraught with technical problems, expensive and a legal minefield.

“Without Siemens it will be very hard to do it,” said an industry source.

But the majority of the specialists said it can be done — even if it has never been attempted before.

Hunt for a Contractor

A firm involved in building the Crimean power plants had hired a Russian company called Interavtomatika, which is 45.7 percent owned by Siemens, to help turn on the turbines, according to three sources familiar with the project.

Since then, Siemens said it has got a written undertaking from Interavtomatika that it will halt any activities connected to Crimea.

In an implied threat to pull out of the venture, a company source familiar with the matter has also said Siemens is reviewing its engagement in its Russian businesses. The source declined to say whether that could affect Interavtomatika and Siemens declined to comment.

EU companies are banned from transferring energy technology to Crimea under the sanctions, imposed after Moscow seized the peninsula from Ukraine in 2014. But, in a loophole Moscow seems to have exploited, their Russian subsidiaries are not directly liable.

When asked if its turbines could be assembled, installed, and commissioned without its cooperation, Siemens said it was unwilling to speculate about future developments and did not want to fuel such speculation. Russia’s Energy Ministry did not respond to a Reuters request for comment.

Several of the industry sources said a Russian firm called ROTEK had experience with Siemens turbines. It is part of the Renova conglomerate controlled by billionaire Viktor Vekselberg.

The company, along with its partners, services 13 Siemens gas turbines in Russia similar to the model delivered to Crimea, according to ROTEK’s website. The company, asked by Reuters if it has been approached to help with the Crimea turbines, declined to comment.

Some of the Siemens turbines ROTEK services are installed at power stations owned by gas giant Gazprom and ROTEK services those ones with a Gazprom-owned firm called Teploenergoremont-Servis. That company, via a representative in Gazprom’s power division, declined to comment.

High Risk

Any Russian company that agrees to set up the Crimea turbines must weigh the “very high” risk of sanctions being imposed on any EU or US business it has, according to Artyom Zhavoronkov, partner in the Russian office of law firm Dentons.

Renova has assets in the European Union and the United States. Gazprom has assets in the European Union.

Russian officials have not acknowledged shipping Siemens turbines to Crimea. They say the turbines were obtained second hand and were Russian-made. Siemens makes turbines at a factory it co-owns in Russia.

Technopromexport, the Russian company building the Crimean power plants, has also not confirmed the turbines are made by Siemens. It declined to go into detail on how they would be serviced, beyond saying it would be “by Russian specialists and contractors”.

If no firm wants to take on the job, Technopromexport and its partners could instead assemble a team of specialists themselves to get the task done, several of the industry specialists said.

One person close to the Crimea power plants project said a recruitment drive was already underway to find people in the Russian power sector who had experience of launching Siemens gas turbines.

According to one industry specialist, 18 turbines of the same model now in Crimea have previously been launched in Russian power stations. As a result, there is a pool of people who have at least observed the turbines being commissioned.

“In theory you can try to launch them without Siemens,” said one industry specialist, who, like all the other people in the sector who spoke to Reuters, requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.

The turbines can be launched if you “gather up the people and the know-how from when these turbines were already used, in Russia and abroad,” said the first industry source.

The model of Siemens turbines the German firm and the three sources close to the power plant say is now in Crimea — the SGT5-2000E — is not the latest word in turbine technology, but is highly sophisticated.

It is run by an automatic control system that uses Siemens proprietary software. It contains highly-engineered parts — such as the blades that turn the turbine — which up to now have only ever been bought from Siemens or its partners.

The blades need to be replaced after between three and four years and no home grown Russian company manufactures blades compatible with the Siemens turbines in Crimea, several of the specialists told Reuters.

Workarounds mentioned by people in the industry included sourcing non-original spare parts from manufacturers in China, Russian engineers attempting to replicate the blades themselves or trying to buy them via intermediaries.

“There are organisations in Russia that, in principle, can make the blades,” said an energy sector source in ex-Soviet Belarus who has experience of working with Siemens equipment. “How reliable they are, that’s another matter.”


Beware of Contracts Signed by Specially Designated Nationals

2017/08/03

(Source: Commonwealth Trading Partners)

By: Chalinee Tinaves, Esq., Commonwealth Trading Partners, ctinaves@ctp-inc.com.

On July 20, 2017, the Office of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $2 million penalty against ExxonMobil Corporation and two of its subsidiaries for violating the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations. According to OFAC, ExxonMobil violated the sanctions when its execs dealt in services with Igor Sechin, President of Rosneft OAO, when they signed eight legal documents relating to oil and gas projects in Russia between May 14, 2014, and May 23, 2014.

If you’ll travel back in time to March 2014, as tensions were heating up regarding Russian deployment of military forces in the Crimea region of Ukraine, President Obama issued Executive Order 13661, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine,” in response to actions deemed to constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the U.S. Section 1(a)(ii) authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to designate officials of the Government of the Russian Federation, block any property or interests in property, and prohibit dealing in any property and interests in property of a person listed on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). Section 4 of E.O. 13661 prohibited US persons from making “any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order” as well as receiving “any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services” from a designated person.

On April 28, 2014, OFAC designated Igor Sechin as an official of the Russian government, thereby generally prohibiting US persons from conducting transactions with him. Although Rosneft OAO is:

  • designated on the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (SSI List) pursuant to Executive Order 13662 “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine;”
  • subject to Directive 2 (prohibiting transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of greater than 90 days maturity if that debt is issued on or after the sanctions effective date by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of the persons operating in Russia’s energy sector); and
  • subject to Directive 4 (prohibition against the direct or indirect provision of, exportation, or reexportation of goods, services, or technology in support of exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil in the Russian Federation or in maritime area claimed by Russian Federation and extending from its Territory); nonetheless, Rosneft OAO is not designated on the SDN List and is therefore not subject to blocking sanctions.

As you can see, the conflict lies in how to conduct business transactions with an organization that is not blocked with an executive who is. According to the release, OFAC rejected ExxonMobil’s position that Sechin was acting in his professional capacity as President of Rosneft OAO when they signed the legal documents. Specifically, ExxonMobil referenced comments by a Treasury Department spokesman in April 2014 allowing BP Plc Chief Executive, Bob Dudley, to remain on the board of directors of Rosneft OAO so long as he did not discuss personal business with Sechin. In rejecting this argument, OFAC indicated that statement did not address ExxonMobil’s conduct nor did the plain language of Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations include a distinction between “personal” or “professional.” Further, OFAC has not interpreted the Regulations to create a carve-out for designated parties acting in their professional capacity.

Interestingly, in support of its position, OFAC pointed to its Frequently Asked Question #285 published on March 18, 2013, regarding the Burma Sanctions Program. Although conveniently now removed from OFAC’s FAQs and website following the termination of the Burma Sanctions Regulations, an archived link detailing FAQ #285 captured the full text of OFAC’s response to ministry dealings with a designated Burmese Government minister. According to OFAC:

A government ministry is not blocked solely because the minister heading it is an SDN. U.S. persons should, however, be cautious in dealings with the ministry to ensure that they are not, for example, entering into any contracts that are signed by the SDN.

However, in Treasury’s restatement of FAQ #285 in the ExxonMobil announcement, OFAC indicated that US parties should “be cautious in dealings with [a non-designated] entity to ensure that they are not providing funds, goods, or services to the SDN, for example, by entering into any contracts that are signed by the SDN.”

Rejecting ExxonMobil’s rebuttal that OFAC regulations state that different interpretations may exist among and between the sanctions programs that it administers, FAQ #285 “clearly signaled” that OFAC views the signing of a contract with an SDN as prohibited, even if the entity on whose behalf the SDN signed was not sanctioned in situations where sanctions programs also involve SDNs. These reasons, in addition to the definitions of “property” and “property interest” in the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations, E.O. 13661, and statements issued by the White House and the Department of Treasury, served to provide ExxonMobil with notice that signing the legal documents with Sechin would violate the prohibitions in the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations.

In assessing the penalty based on OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, among other aggravating factors, OFAC viewed ExxonMobil’s transaction to be a show of “reckless disregard for U.S. sanctions requirements when it failed to consider warning signs associated with dealing in the blocked services of an SDN” and contributed “significant harm” to the objectives of the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Program. Following the announcement, ExxonMobil stood by its position that it acted in full compliance with the sanctions guidelines in 2014 and argued that the Treasury Department is “trying to retroactively enforce a new interpretation of an executive order that is inconsistent with the explicit and unambiguous guidance from the White House and Treasury issued before the relevant conduct and still publicly available today.”

What does all this mean for U.S. companies? While FAQ #285 was initially crafted to address contracts with a designated government official (which Sechin satisfied based on his designation as a Russian official), it is unclear whether this interpretation would also be applicable in situations involving non-government SDNs and their corporate dealings. Further, the prohibited conduct of entering into a contract signed by an SDN in FAQ #285 was listed as an example. It is entirely possible that a range of other contract activities are prohibited by SDNs like negotiating a contract. Companies must be aware of the risks associated with projects that would require authorization by an SDN. Further, companies can mitigate their risk by screening all the parties involved in a transaction to avoid potentially violating a sanctions program.


Cryomech Charged for Illegal Export to Russian Company on Entity List

2017/07/19

By: Ashleigh Foor

Cryomech, Inc. of Syracuse, NY has received a charge involving its exports of  an LNP-20 Liquid Nitrogen Plant, an item classified as EAR99 in the EAR, from the United States to the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) a.k.a Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIIEF (RFNC-VNIIEF) in Sarov, Russia. Cryomech shipped this item, valued at $33,587, without the required BIS License on or around August 16, 2012. On June 9, 2017 the company received a civil penalty of $28,000 as well as an order to hire an unaffiliated third-party consultant with expertise in U.S. export control laws to complete an external audit of its entire export controls compliance program. Cryomech will not be debarred if penalty is paid and audit is completed with results submitted.

Settlement Documents: https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2015/1114-e2501/file


Rosoboronexport Added to Nonproliferation Act by State

2017/05/11

On March 21, 2017, the Department of State applied the measures authorized in Section 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act against Rosoboronexport (ROE) (Russia) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof. The measures below will remain in place for two years from the effective date unless the Secretary of State determines otherwise.

Rosoboronexport accounts for more than 90% of Russia’s annual arms sales and India is their major client, other leading clients include China, Algeria, Syria, Vietnam, Venezuela and recently Iraq.

Section 3 of the Act, imposes the following measures against Rosoboronexport:

  1. No department or agency of the United States Government may procure or enter into any contract for the procurement of any goods, technology, or services from this foreign person, except to the extent that the Secretary of State otherwise may determine. This measure shall not apply to subcontracts at any tier with ROE and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof made on behalf of the United States Government for goods, technology, and services for the maintenance, repair, overhaul, or sustainment of Mi-17 helicopters for the purpose of providing assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan, as well as for the purpose of combating terrorism and violent extremism globally. Moreover, the ban on U.S. government procurement from the Russian entity Rosoboronexport (ROE) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof shall not apply to United States Government procurement of goods, technology, and services for the purchase, maintenance, or sustainment of the Digital Electro Optical Sensor OSDCAM4060 to improve the U.S. ability to monitor and verify Russia’s Open Skies Treaty compliance. Such subcontracts include the purchase of spare parts, supplies, and related services for these purposes;
  2. 2. No department or agency of the United States Government may provide any assistance to this foreign person, and this person shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the United States Government, except to the extent that the Secretary of State otherwise may determine;
  3. No United States Government sales to this foreign person of any item on the United States Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to this person of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated; and;
  4. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the transfer to this foreign person of items the export of which is controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration Regulations, and any existing such licenses are suspended.

Federal Register: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-03-29/pdf/2017-06224.pdf


BIS Adds 23 Russian Entities to Entity List & Explains License Review Policy

2017/01/31

On December 27, 2016 the Bureau of Industry and Security published a final rule adding 23 Russian Entities to the Entity list and revises the licensing policy in three sections of part 742 of the EAR to clarify that BIS’s review of license applications for exports, reexports and transfers (in- country) to Russia.

BIS revised the CCL based controls sections of the EAR to clarify that it will review license applications to export or reexport to Russia items subject to the EAR and controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation (CB), nuclear nonproliferation (NP) or national security (NS) reasons under a presumption of denial, if the items proposed for export or reexport would make a direct and significant contribution to Russia’s military capabilities.

This final rules revises 742.2 and 742.3 of the EAR to clarify that license applications for items controlled for CB and NP reasons will be reviewed in accordance with the revised licensing policies in paragraph (b)(4) of both 742.2 and 742.3 and with the revised licensing policy in paragraph (b)(7) of 742.4 of the EAR. This rule revises 742.4(b)(7) of the EAR to clarify that license applications for items controlled for NS reasons will be reviewed under a presumption of denial if the items would make a direct and significant contribution to Russia’s military capabilities, including but not limited to, the major weapons systems described in Supplement No. 7 to part 742 of the EAR.

This final rule adds the following twenty-three entities to the Entity List:

Crimea Region of Ukraine:

  1. Crimean Ports, a.k.a., the following three aliases:
  • State Unitary Enterprise of the
  • Republic of Crimea ‘Crimean Ports’;
  • Sue RC ‘KMP’;
  • Sue RK ‘Crimean Ports’

28 Kirov Street, Kerch, Crimea Region of Ukraine 98312

 

  1.  Crimean Railway, a.k.a., the following three aliases:
  • Federal State Unitary Enterprise ‘Crimean Railway’;
  • Krymzhd;
  • The Railways of Crimea

34 Pavlenko Street, Simferopol, Crimea Region of Ukraine 95006.
Russia:

  1.  DJSC Factory Krasnoe Znamya, a.k.a., the following five aliases:
  • OJSC Factory Krasnoe Znamya;
  • OAO Zavod Krasnoe Znamya;
  • AO Krasnoye Znamya;
  • Krasnoye Znamya Plant OAO;
  • Krasnoye Znamya Plant JSC.

Shabulina Travel 2a, Ryazan, 390043, Russia

  1.  Ekran Scientific Research Institute, FSUE, a.k.a., the following one alias:
  • FGUP Ekran.

Kirov Avenue 24, Samara 443022, Russia; and Krzhizhanovskogo Street 20/30, Moscow, 117218, Russia;

  1. ElTom Research and Production Company, a.k.a., the following one alias:
  • NPP ElTom

Garshin Street 11, Tomilino, Lyuberetsky, Moscow, 140070, Russia

  1.  FSUE FNPC Nizhegorodsky Scientific Research Institute of Radiotechnics (NNIIRT),

Shaposhnikov Street 5, Nizhny Novgorod, 603950, Russia

  1.  Institut Stroiproekt, AO, a.k.a., the following six aliases:
  • Aktsionernoe Obshcestvo Institut Stroiproekt;
  • AO Institut Stroiproekt;
  • AO Institute Stroyproekt (f.k.a., Institut Stroiproekt Zakrytoe Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo);
  • Institute Stroyproect;
  • Stroyproekt;
  • Stroyproekt Engineering Group

D. 13 Korp. 2 LiteraA Prospekt Dunaiski, St. Petersburg 196158, Russia; and 13/2 Dunaisky Prospect, St. Petersburg 196158, Russia

  1. JSC GOZ Obukhov Plant, a.k.a., the following one alias:
  • GOZ Obukhov Plant

Prospekt Obukhovskoi Oboroni 120, Saint Petersburg, 192012, Russia

  1. JSC Institute of Instrumentation— Novosibirsk Plant Comintern (NPO NIIP–NZIK), Planetnaya Street 32, Novosibirsk, 630015, Russia
  2.  JSC Scientific Research Institute of Aircraft Equipment (NIIAO), a.k.a., the following three aliases:
  • SRIAE;
  • NIIAO;
  • Aviation Instrument Scientific Research Institute

Tupoleva 18, Zhukovsky, Moscow, 140182, Russia

  1.  Kaluga Scientific Research Radio Technology Institute (KRRTI), a.k.a., the following two aliases:
  • KNIRTI;
  • KRRTI

Lenin Street 2, Zhukov, Kaluga Oblast, 249192, Russia

  1.  Karst, OOO, a.k.a., the following four aliases:
  • Construction Holding Company Old City—Karst;
  • Karst Ltd.;
  • LLC Karst;
  • Obshcestvo S Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Karst

D. 4 Litera A Pomeshchenie 69 ul. Kapitanskaya, St. Petersburg 199397, Russiaand 4 Kapitanskaya Street, Unit A, Office 69–N, St. Petersburg 199397, Russia

  1. LLC Ruschemtrade, St. Mashinostroitelnyj, 3, Rostov-on- Don 344090, Russia; and 86/1, Temryuk, Krasnodar 353500, Russia
  2.  OAO All-Russia Research Institute of Radio Equipment (JSC VNIIRA), a.k.a., the following three aliases:
  • OJSC VNIIRA;
  • OAO All-Russia Research Institute of Radio Technology;
  • All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Radio Equipment

Shkipersky Protok 19, V.I. St. Petersburg, 199106, Russia

  1.  OJSC Ural Production Company Vector (UPP Vector), a.k.a., the following two aliases:
  • JSC ‘SCP’ Vector;
  • JSC PPM Vector

Gagarin Street 28, Ekaterinburg, 620078, Russia

  1.  Olid Ltd., a.k.a., the following one alias:
  • OOO Solid

ul Mira 4, Novorossiysk, Krasnodarskiy kray 630024, Russia

  1.  Research and Production Association KVANT, a.k.a., the following one alias:
  • NPO Kvant

Bolshaya Saint Petersburg 73, Velikii- Novgorod 173003, Russia

  1.  Research and Production Association M.V. Frunze, a.k.a., the following two aliases:
  • NNPO Frunze;
  • NZIF

Gagarin Prospect 174, Nizhny Novgorod, 606950, Russia

  1.  Ryazan State Instrument Enterprise (RSIE), a.k.a., the following two aliases:
  • RSIE;
  • GRPZ

Seminarskaya Street 32, Ryazan, 390000, Russia

  1.  Scientific and Production Association ‘‘Lianozovo Electromechanical Plant’’ (NPO LEMZ), a.k.a., the following four aliases:
  • JSC LEMZ R&P Corporation;
  • OAO Design Bureau Lianozovsky Radars Moscow;
  • Lianozovsky Electromechanical factory;
  • OAO Design Bureau Lianozovsky

Radars Moscow. Dmitrovskoye Shosse 110, Moscow, 127411, Russia

  1.  Svyaz Design Bureau, OJSC, a.k.a., the following one alias:
  • KB Svyaz. Prospect Sokolova 96

Rostov-on-Don 344010, Russia

  1.  Trans-Flot JSC, a.k.a., the following one alias:
  • JSC Trans-Flot

ul Ventseka 1/97, Samara 443099, Russia

  1.  Transpetrochart Co. Ltd., Prospekt Engelsa 30, St. Petersburg 194156, Russia.

 

Federal Register: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-12-27/pdf/2016-31124.pdf