Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

President Signs Export Controls Legislation Subjecting Emerging and Foundational Technologies to Enhanced Controls

2018/08/30

(Source: Vinson & Elkins LLP, 14 Aug 2018.)

By: David R. Johnson, Esq., drjohnson@velaw.com, +1 202-639-6706; and Daniel J. Gerkin, Esq., dgerkin@velaw.com, +1 202-639-6654. Both of Vinson & Elkins LLP.

The President has signed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019 (“NDAA”), which, in addition to expanding the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) to review foreign direct investment,1 implements the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (“ECA”), which sharpens the focus of the U.S. government on emerging and foundational technologies that are deemed not to have been adequately addressed by the prevailing U.S. export control regimes. The NDAA also places limits on the procurement of equipment and services from certain Chinese entities, though certain Members of Congress had adamantly advocated for much more stringent restrictions.

Please find a more detailed discussion of certain of the key aspects of the ECA, as well as the procurement-related restrictions set forth in the NDAA, below.

Export Controls Act of 2018

Permanent Statutory Authority for U.S. Export Controls. With limited exceptions, the ECA repeals the Export Administration Act of 1979, which lapsed several years ago and has been statutorily authorized each year since pursuant to Executive Orders issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). Accordingly, the ECA now serves as the permanent statutory authority for the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”), which generally govern the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of commercial and dual-use commodities, software and technology, and which are administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce (“BIS”).2

Treatment of Emerging and Other Types of Critical Technologies. In addition to ensuring permanent statutory authority for the existing commercial and dual-use export controls regime, the ECA directs the President, in coordination with the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and Energy to develop a “regular and robust process to identify the emerging and other types of critical technologies of concern and regulate their release to foreign persons as warranted regardless of the nature of the underlying transaction.” Specifically, these agencies are tasked by the ECA with identifying “emerging and foundational technologies” that are essential to the national security of the United States, but which are not currently controlled for export purposes.3

The process for identifying such technologies will be informed by publicly available information, classified information, information arising out of the CFIUS review process, and information generated by the various BIS advisory committees, and will take into account the development of such technologies in foreign countries, the effect export controls might have on continuing U.S. development efforts, and the effectiveness of export controls with respect to limiting the proliferation of such technologies to foreign countries.

The identified technologies will, following a notice and comment period, be subjected to enhanced U.S. export controls, possibly to include licensing requirements, and will be proposed for inclusion in multilateral export control regimes. At a minimum, licenses will be required for countries subject to a U.S. embargo, including those that solely are arms embargoed, such as China.4 Please note that license applications submitted by or on behalf of a joint venture, joint development agreement, or similar collaborative arrangement may require the identification of any foreign person with a significant ownership interest in a foreign person participating in the arrangement.

The following activities will be excepted from any licensing requirements:

  • The sale or lease of a finished item and the provision of associated technology if such items and technology are generally made available to customers, distributors, or resellers;
  • The sale or license to a customer of a product and the provision of integration or similar services if such services generally are made available to customers;
  • The transfer of equipment and provision of associated technology to operate the equipment if the foreign person could not use the equipment to produce critical technologies;
  • The procurement by a U.S. person of goods or services, including manufacturing services, from a foreign person if the foreign person has no rights to exploit any technology contributed by the U.S. person other than to supply the procured goods or services; and
  • Contributions and associated support provided by a U.S. person to an industry organization related to a standard or specification, whether in development or declared, including any license of, or commitment to license, intellectual property in compliance with the rules of any standards organization.

The ECA requires reporting to Congress and to CFIUS every 180 days regarding actions taken to identify and control emerging and foundational technologies.

Changes to Licensing Process. The ECA mandates that applications for licenses address “the impact of a proposed export of an item on the United States defense industrial base” and an assessment of whether “the denial of an application for a license or a request for an authorization of any export that would have a significant negative impact on such defense industrial base.” By significant negative impact, the ECA means:

  • “A reduction in the availability of an item produced in the United States that is likely to be acquired by the Department of Defense . . . for the advancement of the national security of the United States, or for the production of an item in the United States for the Department of Defense . . . for the advancement of the national security of the United States.”
  • “A reduction in the production in the United States of an item that is the result of research and development carried out, or funded by, the Department of Defense . . . to advance the national security of the United States, or a federally funded research and development center.”
  • “A reduction in the employment of United States persons whose knowledge and skills are necessary for the continued production in the United States of an item that is likely to be acquired by the Department of Defense . . . for the advancement of the national security of the United States.”

Criminal and Civil Penalties. Like the IEEPA, the ECA authorizes criminal penalties of up to $1 million and imprisonment for not more than 20 years. However, the ECA increases the current inflation-adjusted maximum civil penalty to the greater of $300,000 or twice the value of the underlying transaction. These also are the criminal and civil penalties set forth in the Anti-Boycott Act of 2018.

Treatment of Certain Chinese Telecommunications Equipment Manufacturers and Service Providers

Over the objections of Sen. Marco Rubio, among others, the NDAA ultimately did not reimpose sanctions on Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturer and service provider, Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (“ZTE Corporation”), and certain of its affiliates, which were subject to a BIS denial order arising out of U.S. export control violations stemming from transactions involving Iran and North Korea. That denial order was terminated, effective July 13, 2018.

The ECA does, however, prohibit federal agencies from procuring or obtaining, or entering into contracts with entities using, equipment, systems, or services that, in turn, use Chinese-origin telecommunications equipment or services deemed to be a “substantial or essential component of any system” or “critical technology as part of any system.” The targeted Chinese-origin telecommunications equipment or services are:

  • Telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities;
  • For the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced by Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Technology Company, Dahua Technology Company, or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities;
  • Telecommunications or video surveillance services provided by any of the above-named entities or using the above-described equipment; and
  • Telecommunications or video surveillance equipment or services produced or provided by an entity reasonably believed to be owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the Chinese government.

 

Visit our website to learn more about V&E’s Export Controls and Economic Sanctions practice. For more information, please contact Vinson & Elkins lawyers Dave Johnson or Daniel Gerkin.

The changes to the CFIUS review process are discussed in greater detail at http://www.velaw.com/Insights/President-Signs-Sweeping-Expansion-of-CFIUS-Review-of-Foreign-Direct-Investment/.
2 The EAR also encompass the regulations that govern the participation of U.S. persons in unsanctioned foreign boycotts. These regulations now are permanently authorized by the Anti-Boycott Act of 2018.
Please note that the EAR currently allow for the imposition of temporary controls on items in accordance with their interim classification within Export Control Classification Number 0Y521.
4 The ECA also requires a review of the current controls on exports, reexports, and in-country transfers for military end uses and military end users in U.S. and United Nations arms-embargoed countries, as well as a review of the Commerce Control List of items that currently are not subject to any licensing for U.S. arms-embargoed countries.


President Trump Re-Imposes First Wave of Sanctions Against Iran and EU Expands Blocking Regulation to Cover US Secondary Sanctions Legislation on Iran

2018/08/30

(Source: Arent Fox LLP, 8 Aug 2018.)

By: Kay C. Georgi, Esq., kay.georgi@arentfox.com, +1 202-857-6293; Marwa M. Hassoun, Esq., marwa.hassoun@arentfox.com, +1 213-443-7645; and Regan K. Alberda, Esq., regan.alberda@arentfox.com, +1 202-775-5771.  All of Arent Fox LLP.

The President issued an Executive Order on August 6, 2018, “Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran” (the New Iran EO), which re-imposes relevant provisions of five Iran sanctions EOs (EOs 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645). Additionally, the New Iran EO implements provisions in two former EOs (EOs 13716 and 13628) and revokes those EOs.

Additionally, the New Iran EO implements provisions in two former EOs (EOs 13716 and 13628) and revokes those EOs.

August 6, 2018 marked the end of the 90-day wind-down period following the President’s decision to end the United States’ participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Effective August 7, 2018, the US government can re-impose secondary sanctions that had been suspended under the Iran nuclear deal on persons who engage in specified transactions involving any of the following sectors/activities:

  • The purchase or acquisition of US dollar banknotes by the Government of Iran;
  • Iran’s trade in gold or precious metals;
  • The direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw, or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
  • Significant transactions related to the purchase or sale of Iranian rials, or the maintenance of significant funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran denominated in the Iranian rial;
  • The purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt; and
  • Iran’s automotive sector.

Following the end of the 90-day wind-down period on August 6, 2018, the US government is also revoking the below JCPOA-related authorizations under US primary sanctions regarding Iran:

  • The importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs and certain related financial transactions pursuant to general licenses under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations;
  • Activities undertaken pursuant to specific licenses issued in connection with the Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (JCPOA SLP); and
  • Activities undertaken pursuant to General License I relating to contingent contracts for activities eligible for authorization under the JCPOA SLP.

The remaining secondary sanctions can be re-imposed on November 5, 2018, following the end of the 180-day wind down period on November 4, 2018, on persons who engage in specified transactions involving any of the following sectors/activities:

  • Iran’s port operators, and shipping and shipbuilding sectors, including on the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, South Shipping Line Iran, or their affiliates;
  • Petroleum-related transactions with, among others, the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Company, and National Iranian Tanker Company, including the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran;
  • Transactions by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran and designated Iranian financial institutions under Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012;
  • The provision of specialized financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions described in Section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act of 2010;
  • The provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance; and
  • Iran’s energy sector, including a variety of separate specific activities related to the petroleum and petrochemical industries under the Iran Sanctions Act as amended.

Additionally, on or by November 5, 2018:

  • The US government will revoke the General License H wind-down authorization that had allowed US-owned or-controlled foreign entities to wind down certain activities with the Government of Iran or persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran that were previously authorized by General License H; and
  • The US government can re-impose, as appropriate, the sanctions that applied to persons removed from the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) and/or other lists maintained by the U.S. government on January 16, 2016.

OFAC’s FAQs about the re-imposition of Iran sanctions can be found on OFAC’s website.

One question that OFAC answers in its updated FAQs (FAQ 601) is whether the New Iran EO expands the scope of sanctions that were in effect prior to January 16, 2016 (Implementation Day of the JCPOA), and the answer is:

  • Yes. The New Iran EO broadens the scope of the sanctions that were in effect prior to January 16, 2016 and provides for greater consistency in the administration of Iran-related sanctions provisions.

OFAC provides a list of added measures, but they are largely in the nature of tweaking the authorities for providing new blocking sanctions and slightly expanding the sanctions that can be imposed for activities involving petroleum and petrochemical sectors in Iran. More specifically, according to OFAC, the new Iran EO:

  • Provides new authority for: (i) blocking sanctions on persons who provide material support for, or goods and services in support of, persons blocked for various already existing sanction activities, such as being part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran; (ii) correspondent and payable-through account sanctions on foreign financial institutions determined to have knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction on behalf of the persons blocked under the new authorities;
  • Expands the menu of sanctions available to impose on persons determined to have engaged in certain significant transactions relating to petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemicals from Iran by authorizing the imposition of:
    • Visa restrictions on corporate officers, principals, or controlling shareholders of a sanctioned person;
    • Additional sanctions on principal executive officers of a sanctioned person; and
    • Prohibitions on US persons investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person.
  • Expands the prohibition on US-owned or -controlled foreign entities by prohibiting transactions with persons blocked for:
    • Providing material support for, or goods and services in support of, Iranian persons on the SDN List and certain other designated persons; or
    • Being part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or a port operator in Iran or knowingly providing significant support to certain other persons blocked or on the SDN List.

Since these last activities were already prohibited under Section 218 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and OFAC’s implementing regulations, it is unclear whether in fact this last is a true expansion or an adjustment of authority.

EU Reaction – Amendment of Blocking Regulation

As anticipated, the EU reacted by publishing, and thereby bringing into effect, an amendment to the Annex to Council Regulation No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.

The revised Annex increases the number of laws subject to the blocking regulations, including, notably:

  • The energy sanctions contained in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 as amended;
  • The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012;
  • The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012;
  • The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012; and
  • The Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.

According to the guidance published by the EU, the Blocking Statute:

  • Prohibits EU operators from complying with the listed extra-territorial legislation, or any decision, ruling or award based thereon, given that the EU does not recognize its applicability to/effects towards EU operators (Article 5, paragraph 1);
  • Requires EU operators to inform the European Commission within 30 days of any events arising from listed extra-territorial legislation or actions based thereon or resulting thereof, that affect, directly or indirectly, their economic or financial interests;
  • Nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign decision, including court rulings or arbitration awards, based on the listed extra-territorial legislation or the acts and provisions adopted pursuant to them (Article 4);
  • Allows EU operators to recover damages arising from the application of the listed extra-territorial legislation from the natural or legal persons or entities causing them (Article 6). Damages are defined as ‘any damages, including legal costs, caused by the application of the laws specified in its Annex or by actions based thereon or resulting therefrom’; and
  • Allows EU operators to request an authorization to comply with the listed extra-territorial legislation, if not doing so would cause serious harm to their interests or the interests of the EU (Article 5, paragraph 2).

The Blocking Regulation applies to the EU subsidiaries of US companies, thereby placing them in a potentially difficult position. Moreover, the EU Guidance specifically states that EU operators cannot, consistent with the EU Blocking Regulations, request licenses from the United States unless they request the European Commission to authorize them to apply for such a license. At the same time, the EU Guidance specifically notes that EU companies remain free to do or not to do business with Cuba and Iran, provided such business decisions are not forced on the EU companies by the listed US legislation.


Germany Launches Iran Advice Office Over U.S. Sanctions

2018/07/30

(Source: European Sanctions Blog, 19 June 2018.)

By:  Maya Lester, Esq., Brick Court Chambers, maya.lester@brickcourt.co.uk, +44 20 7379 3550.

In June the German government announced that it has created an “Iran contact point” to guide companies in their business transactions with Iran, given President Trump’s recent decision to reimpose US sanctions on Iran. The German government also stated that EU sanctions relief for Iran, one of the terms under the JCPOA, remained in place, and that government-backed export credit guarantees were still available.

Details: https://europeansanctions.com/2018/06/19/germany-launches-iran-advice-office-over-us-sanctions/


Newly Unsealed Federal Indictment Charges Iranian Businessman with Illegally Exporting Nuclear Nonproliferation-Controlled Materials from Illinois

2018/07/30

(Source: Justice, 21 Jun 2018.)

Saeed Valadbaigi, also known as “Saeed Valad” and “Saeed Baigi,” is an Iranian businessman who conspired with the owner of a European company to illegally export nuclear nonproliferation-controlled materials to Iran from Illinois, according to a newly unsealed federal indictment. Valadbaigi,56, is considered a fugitive and a warrant for his arrest was issued in 2016 and remains outstanding.

In 2011 Valadbaigi plotted to illegally export U.S.-origin 7075 T6 Aluminum tubing from Illinois to Iran by way of Belgium and Malaysia, the indictment states. The indictment states that the size and type of the aluminum is subject to U.S. regulations for nuclear nonproliferation purposes. According to the charges, Valadbaigi’s smuggling plan was an effort to avoid U.S. laws and export control regulations.

The newly unsealed indictment accuses Valadbaigi of the following:

  • Three counts of wire fraud
  • Two counts of attempting to violate the international emergency economic powers act
  • One count of conspiracy to defraud the united states
  • One count of illegally exporting articles from the united states
  • One count of making false statements on a U.S. export form
  • Illegally exporting titanium sheets from a company in northern Illinois, to Iran, by way of the republic of Georgia, the United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia
  • In 2012, ordered acrylic sheets from a company in Connecticut and falsely claimed that the sheets would be used only in Hong Kong which he later allegedly arranged to be transshipped to Iran

Sentencing:

  • Each count of wire fraud and attempting to violate the IEEPA results in a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison
  • The illegal export charge is punishable by up to ten years in prison
  • The conspiracy and false statement counts are each punishable by up to five years

The public is reminded that an indictment is not evidence of guilt.  The defendant is presumed innocent and entitled to a fair trial at which the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If convicted, the Court must impose a reasonable sentence under federal statutes and the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

The charges against Valadbaigi are part of an investigation that previously resulted in the conviction of Nicholas Kaiga, who managed and later owned the Belgium company that did business with Valadbaigi. Kaiga admitted in a plea agreement that he was aware the 7075 Aluminum was subject to U.S. export controls and that it could not be exported to Malaysia without a license from the U.S. Department of Commerce, which neither he nor Valadbaigi possessed. Kaiga admitted that he used his company, Industrial Metals and Commodities, as an intermediary to export the 7075 Aluminum tubing from a company in northern Illinois, to Belgium and then to Malaysia, on behalf of Valadbaigi. Kaiga pleaded guilty to violating U.S. export control regulations and was sentenced in 2015 to two years and three months in a U.S. prison.

Details: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20180627.aspx


OFAC Revokes JCPOA-Related General Licenses, Amends Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, and Publishes Updated FAQ

2018/07/30

(Source: Treasury/OFAC, 27 Jun 2018.)

Several actions are being taken in furtherance of President Trump’s May 8, 2018 decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and begin re-imposing the U.S. nuclear-related sanctions that were lifted to effectuate the JCPOA sanctions relief, following a wind-down period. These actions include:

  • The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has revoked Iran-related General Licenses H and I, which were issued in connection with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Archival versions of General Licenses H and Iwill still be available on OFAC’s website to assist persons in determining which activities were not sanctionable or prohibited while those authorizations were in effect and how best to wind down such activity.
  • OFAC also amended the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (ITSR), in order to narrow the scope of the general licenses authorizing the importation into the United States of, and dealings in, Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, as well as related letters of credit and brokering services, to the wind down of such activities through August 6, 2018 and to issue two new general licenses authorizing the wind down, through August 6, 2018, of transactions previously authorized under General License I, and the wind down, through November 4, 2018, of transactions previously authorized under General License H.  The amendment of the ITSR is now effective and published in the Federal Register.
  • OFAC has also updated Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5from its FAQs Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 2018 NSPM Relating to the JCPOA.

Details: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20180627.aspx


U.S. Will Consider Requests for Waivers from Iran Oil Sanctions

2018/07/30

(Source: Reuters, 10 Jul 2018.)

In November, the United States will put into effect sanctions that will prevent Iran from exporting oil. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the U.S. will consider requests from some countries to be exempted from these sanctions. “There will be a handful of countries that come to the United States and ask for relief from that. We’ll consider it,” Pompeo said according to an interview in Abu Dhabi with Sky News Arabia released by the U.S. State Department. He did not name any specific countries.

Details: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-oil/u-s-will-consider-requests-for-waivers-from-iran-oil-sanctions-pompeo-idUSKBN1K0236


White House Releases Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

2018/05/30

The White House released this document to help companies understand how pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal will affect them. Some questions answer in the document are:

  • Effective May 8, 2018, what sanctions snap back into place?
  • Which sanctions will be re-imposed after the 90-day wind-down period ending on August 6, 2018?
  • Which sanctions will be re-imposed after the 180-day wind-down period ending on November 4, 2018?

Full Document: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf


Turkish Banker Receives 32 Months for Violating U.S. Sanctions Against Iran Involving Billions of Dollars

2018/05/30

By: Ashleigh Foor

On January 3, 2018, a five-week jury trial wrapped up and convicted Mehmet Hakan Atilla, 47, a resident and citizen of Turkey, to 32 months for conspiring with others in a scheme to violate U.S. economic sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran. The violation involved billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil proceeds held at Atilla’s employer (Turkish Bank-1).

Atilla, a Turkish banker, Reza Zarrab, an international gold trader, and others defrauded U.S. financial institutions by using them to conduct transactions on behalf of the government of Iran and other Iranian entities which were barred by U.S. sanction. They did so by making these transactions falsely appear as if they involved food, therefore falling within humanitarian exceptions to the sanctions regime.

Atilla lied to U.S. Treasury officials about Turkish Bank-1’s activities and its supposed compliance efforts to avoid subjecting the bank to U.S. sanctions. Atilla and his co-conspirators’ deceptions led U.S. banks to unknowingly process international financial transactions in violation of the IEEPA, and to launder through the U.S. financial system funds promoting the scheme.


Summary of the Presidential Memorandum: “Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking Additional Action to Counter Iran’s Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon”

2018/05/30

By: Ashleigh Foor

(Source: The White House)

On May 8, 2018, President Trump addressed the United States in a Presidential Memorandum, “Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking Additional Action to Counter Iran’s Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon”. He started by stating that the safety and security of the United States and the American people is his highest priority. He then stated that since the inception of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the revolutionary theocracy has declared its hostility toward the United States and remains the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, listing other offenses such as human rights abuses and proving assistance to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and other terrorist networks.

“There is no doubt that Iran previously attempted to bolster its revolutionary aims through the pursuit of nuclear weapons and that Iran’s uranium enrichment program continues to give it the capability to reconstitute its weapons-grade uranium program if it so chooses,” stated the President. Therefore, as President, he has approved an “integrated strategy for Iran that includes the strategic objective of denying Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon.”

Trump then goes on to explain the preceding administration’s participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as an attempt to meet the threat of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities. Although some believed the JCPOA would moderate Iran’s behavior, he said, Iran has only escalated its destabilizing activities. “Iran’s behavior threatens the national interest of the United States,” said the President. On January 12, 2018, Trump outlined two paths moving forward – that the JCPOA’s “disastrous flaws would be fixed by May 12, 2018, or, failing that, the United States would cease participation in the agreement.” He states that these issues were not fixed and that he is making good on his pledge to end the United States’ participation in the JCPOA. “Further, I have determined that it is in the national interest of the United States to re-impose sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA as expeditiously as possible,” Trump stated.

The changes are outlined below:

Section 1.  Policy.  It is the policy of the United States that Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles; that Iran’s network and campaign of regional aggression be neutralized; to disrupt, degrade, or deny the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its surrogates access to the resources that sustain their destabilizing activities; and to counter Iran’s aggressive development of missiles and other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities.  The United States will continue to pursue these aims and the objectives contained in the Iran strategy that I announced on October 13, 2017, adjusting the ways and means to achieve them as required.

Sec. 2.  Ending United States Participation in the JCPOA.  The Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Energy, take all appropriate steps to cease the participation of the United States in the JCPOA.

Sec. 3.  Restoring United States Sanctions.  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately begin taking steps to re-impose all United States sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA, including those under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and the Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act of 2012.  These steps shall be accomplished as expeditiously as possible, and in no case later than 180 days from the date of this memorandum.  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall coordinate, as appropriate, on steps needed to achieve this aim.  They shall, for example, coordinate with respect to preparing any recommended executive actions, including appropriate documents to re-impose sanctions lifted by Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016; preparing to re-list persons removed, in connection with the JCPOA, from any relevant sanctions lists, as appropriate; revising relevant sanctions regulations; issuing limited waivers during the wind-down period, as appropriate; and preparing guidance necessary to educate United States and non-United States business communities on the scope of prohibited and sanctionable activity and the need to unwind any such dealings with Iranian persons.  Those steps should be accomplished in a manner that, to the extent reasonably practicable, shifts the financial burden of unwinding any transaction or course of dealing primarily onto Iran or the Iranian counterparty.

Sec. 4.  Preparing for Regional Contingencies.  The Secretary of Defense and heads of any other relevant agencies shall prepare to meet, swiftly and decisively, all possible modes of Iranian aggression against the United States, our allies, and our partners.  The Department of Defense shall ensure that the United States develops and retains the means to stop Iran from developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon and related delivery systems.

Sec. 5.  Monitoring Iran’s Nuclear Conduct and Consultation with Allies and Partners.  Agencies shall take appropriate steps to enable the United States to continue to monitor Iran’s nuclear conduct.  I am open to consultations with allies and partners on future international agreements to counter the full range of Iran’s threats, including the nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missile threats, and the heads of agencies shall advise me, as appropriate, regarding opportunities for such consultations.

Sec. 6.  General Provisions.

(a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.


Company Pays $1,220,400 for 37 Violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations

2018/02/08

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced in December 2017, a $1,220,400 settlement with DENTSPLY SIRONA INC. (DSI), a US company with the successor in interest to DENTSPLY International Inc. (“DII” and, together with DSI, “DENTSPLY”) to settle a potential civil liability for 37 apparent violations of § 560.204 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560 (ITSR).

Around November 26, 2009 and July 5, 2012, DII subsidiaries UK International (“UKI”) and DS Healthcare Inc. (d.b.a. Sultan Healthcare), (“Sultan”), exported 37 shipments of dental equipment and supplies from the US, directly or indirectly to Iran, to distributors in third-countries, with knowledge or reason to know that the goods were ultimately destined for Iran.  OFAC determined that DII did not voluntarily disclose the apparent violations and that the apparent violations constitute a non-egregious case.

Full Details: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20171206.aspx