Archive for the ‘Australia Group’ Category

ECCN 1C352 Removed to Implement Australia Group November 2013 Decisions


By: Danielle McClellan

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is implementing a few minor changes to the Commerce Control List (CCL) in order to adopt recommendations that were recommended during the November 2013 Australia Group (AG) intersessional implementation meeting.

Effective June 16, 2015, BIS has published a final rule in which the AG “List of Animal Pathogens for Export Control” has been merged with the AG “List of Biological Agents for Export Control.”  There is now a single common control list for these items now known as the AG “List of Human and Animal Pathogens and Toxins for Export Control.” This change does not affect any of the controls on these items.

CHANGE CHEAT SHEET: ECCN 1C352 has been removed and added to ECCN 1C351. The following sections have been changed to reflect the removal of ECCN 1C352 from the CCL:

  • Section 740.20
  • CB Column on the Commerce Country Chart
  • Section 742.2(a)(1)(i) 
  • Supplement No. 1 to part 742 paragraph (3), (9)(ii), (9)(iii) and 12
  • Section 752.3 paragraph (a)(2)

In addition to this minor change this rule amends the CCL entry that controls chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment to reflect changes to the AG “Control List of Dual-Use Chemical Manufacturing Facilities and Equipment and Related Technology and Software” which revised controls on certain valves, casings (valve bodies) designed for such valves, and preformed casing liners on such valves. This rule also adds a Technical Note clarifying how the terms “multi-seal” and “seal-less” are used with respect to the controls on pumps.

Send comments regarding this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Jasmeet Seehra, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), by email to, or by fax to (202) 395-7285; and to the Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, 14th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Room 2705, Washington, DC 20230.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard P. Duncan, Ph.D., Director, Chemical and Biological Controls Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, Telephone: (202) 482-3343, Email:

BIS Amends CCL to Implement Australia Group Understandings


By: Brooke Driver

As it has revised the EAR to implement changes laid down in the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime this summer, BIS also has finalized changes to the Commerce Control List based on the decisions of the Australia Group at the 2012 plenary meeting. Specifically, this final rule revises the CCL by amending ECCN 1C351 that controls human and zoonotic pathogens and “toxins” in accordance with changes to the AG “List of Biological Agents for Export Control.” The aforementioned changes include the addition of three pathogens and clarifications to two other items. It also revises the controls on plant pathogens, adding five pathogens and six clarifications to the “List of Plant Pathogens for Export Control,” adds certain spray-drying equipment to the AG “Control List of Dual-Use Biological Equipment and Related Technology and Software.”

For details, visit:

BIS Changes EAR Related to Chemical/Biological Weapons Based Controls



By: Danielle McClellan

BIS published a final rule in the Federal Register on July 8, 2008 amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Commerce Control List (CCL) and the list of countries that currently are States Parties to the CWC.

The Australia Group, consisting of 40 countries that work to maintain export controls on a list of chemicals, biological agents and related equipment and technology used in chemical or biological weapons programs. In April 2008 the Australia Group met and agreed upon revisions to the above mentioned documents. The changes are as follows:

  • CCL: ECCN 1C352 paragraph (a) is amended by replacing the following descriptions with the new HPAI language currently used by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE);
    • a.2.a will now state, AI viruses that have an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) in 6- week-old chickens greater than 1.2; or
    • a.2.b. will be added and state, AI viruses that cause at least 75% mortality in 4- to 8- week-old chickens infected intravenously.
  • EAR:Part 745.1 paragraph (a) is amended to update the fax number and address for submitting advance notification and annual report requirements for exports of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);
    • (2) will now read: Send the notification either by fax to (202) 482-1731 or by mail or courier delivery to the following address: Information Technology Team, Treaty Compliance Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 4515, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. Attn: “Advance Notification of Schedule 1 Chemical Export”.
    • (3) will now state: Submit a copy of the end-Use Certificate, no later than 7 days after the date of export, either by fax to (202) 482-1731 or by mail or courier delivery to the following address: Information Technology Team, Treaty Compliance Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 4515, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. Attn: “CWC End-Use Certificate Report”.
  • EAR: Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 is amended to now read “List of States Parties as of July 1, 2008”; and by adding in alphabetical order, the countries “Congo (Republic of the)” and “Guinea-Bissau”.

More information:

Commerce Adjusts CBW Export Controls



By: Danielle McClellan

Effective September 12, 2007, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) will amend the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to reflect changes to the “Control List of Biological Agents”. This rule will amend the EAR to reflect the admission of Croatia into the Australia Group and revises the CCL entry which controls equipment that is can be used in handling any type of biological materials. Lastly, the new rule will amend the list of countries that are States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Barbados will now be joining the party.

More information:

Federal Register Notice

US Announces New Export and Reexport Controls for North Korea



By: John Black

Bottom Line:

This new export licensing requirement that the United States is implementing consistent with a United Nations decision is good for a laugh. Now that North Korean Government officials can’t get I-Pods and stereos, they most certainly will end their nuclear weapons program. (OK, I am not so naïve as to think this new requirement will keep Kim Il Jung from getting an I-Pod.) Seems like the United Nations is developing a taste for useless symbolic export controls so long favored by the United States just because it’s better to do something that doesn’t help than to do nothing.

Due to the flagrant and defiant actions of North Korea over the past year relating to missile testing and the detonation of a nuclear device, the United States is imposing new export and reexport controls on North Korea. This new rule is in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1718 which prohibits the direct or indirect sale of arms and other specified items to North Korea by UN Member States.


US Imposes Sanctions on Important Russian and Chinese Aerospace Entities



By: John Black

The first two weeks of August gave us new US sanctions on two relatively important, or at least notable, entities in the aerospace field:

  • Sukoy (also spelled Sukoi) in Russia, and any successor, sub-unit or subsidiary; and
  • Great Wall Airlines Company Limited (a.k.a Great Wall Airlines; a.k.a. Changcheng Hangkong), 1600 Century Road, Shanghai 200122, China; C.R. No. 001144 (China) Issued 20 Oct 2005 expires 19 Oct 2035

What does all of this actually mean? For starters, there is a big different between the minor sanctions imposed on Sukoy and the significant sanctions imposed on Great Wall Airlines Company.


Specifically, the thrust of the sanctions on Sukoy do not prohibit all exports and reexports to Sukoy and are not an across the board ban on US persons doing business with Sukoy. The most significant sanction is that the US Government may not issue any new export/reexport licenses for Sukoy and any existing ITAR approvals for Sukoy are terminated. The remainder of the US sanctions applies to US Government procurement from Sukoy and US Government assistance to Sukoy.

Specifically, the sanctions announced in the August 4 Federal Register on Sukoy are:

  1. No department or agency of the United States Government may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement of, any goods, technology, or services from these foreign persons;
  2. No department or agency of the United States Government may provide any assistance to the foreign persons, and these persons shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the United States Government;
  3. No United States Government sales to the foreign persons of any item on the United States Munitions List (as in effect on August 8, 1995) are permitted, and all sales to these persons of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated; and
  4. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the transfer to these foreign persons of items the export of which is controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration Regulations, and any existing such licenses are suspended.

So, if you want to export 9A991 civil aircraft parts to Sukoy, you may go full speed ahead. If you want to export to Sukoy something that requires a license for Russia, your license will not be approved.

The official basis for US sanctions on Sukoy are “…for the transfer to Iran since January 1, 1999, of equipment and technology controlled under multilateral export control lists (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement) or otherwise having the potential to make a material contribution to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems.” Sukoy claims it has not recently sold weapons to Iran, but it has been reported that the sanctions may be in response to a deal to repair and upgrade 30 Su-24 ‘Fencer’ long-range strike aircraft. The SU-24 strongly resembles the earlier American F-111, whose FB-111 variant the US Strategic Air Command used as a nuclear strike platform.

Great Wall Airlines Company:

On August 15, 2006, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced that it added Great Wall Airlines Company to its list for “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters.” These sanctions block all property and interests in property that come into the United States or into the possession/control of US persons. What does that mean? It means that if a US company exports to Great Wall and then payment comes from Great Wall to the United States, US regulations block the payment, which means the US company may not have the money. So, for starters, these sanctions effectively prevent US companies from dealing with Great Wall.

On the other hand, the sanctions do not apply if a non-US company, for example, a South Korean company, reexports US origin 9A991 civil aircraft parts from South Korea to Great Wall—as long as no US person receives Property/money from Great Wall. If, however, a US company has foreign customers or partners dealing with Great Wall, it should make sure that there is an impenetrable wall (perhaps even a Great Wall) between the foreign parties’ activities and the US company.

Great Wall Airlines Company operates a small number of Boeing 747-400 freighters for cargo purposes. The US acted against Great Wall Airlines because claims that its parent company, Great Wall Industry Corp. (which is already subject to US Sanctions), provided assistance to Iran’s missile program. Apparently Great Wall Airlines suspended operations on August 18, three days after the US announced its sanctions. I guess these sanctions worked.

BIS Celebrates Australia Group Milestone with New Regulation



By: Scott Gearity

While most college-age Australians have nothing more to remember their birthdays than hangovers and bad sunburns, a rather more sober Australian twenty-year-old recently celebrated its first twenty years stemming the spread of chemical and biological weapons. I am speaking of course of the Australia Group, the informal multilateral export control regime which returned to its place of birth earlier this year for its twentieth annual plenary session. Speaking at the plenary, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer recounted a bit of the organization’s history:

It is 20 years since Australia convened the first meeting of 15 like-minded countries in 1985 in Brussels.

That meeting was a response to the findings of a UN investigation, led by an Australian – Dr Peter Dunn, that Iraq had used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. It posed the question of how to prevent Iraq from acquiring materials for the production of chemical weapons through otherwise legitimate commercial trade.

The response – a proposal to harmonize national export controls – was endorsed by all present at that meeting, and the Australia Group was born.

But the plenary wasn’t all talk with the AG participants agreeing on three control list changes to refine limits on illegitimate trade in items with chemical or biological weapons end uses:

  1. Simplification of the types of pumps subject to controls due to their usefulness in manufacturing chemical weapons (the US controls such equipment under ECCN 2B350.i).
  2. New controls on spraying or fogging systems designed for use with aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and capable of delivering droplets of less than 50 m in diameter at a rate of greater than 2 liters per minute (ECCN 2B352).
  3. A revision to the technical note clarifying that the controls applicable to genetic elements and genetically-modified organisms also cover nucleic acid sequences that represent a significant hazard to human, animal or plant health or enhance the ability of AG-controlled or other microorganisms to cause harm. (This change in particular has potentially significant implications for firms and universities involved in biotechnology research. The revised technical note can be found under ECCN 1C353).

It may have taken nearly four months, but the US Bureau of Industry and Security did finally turn up with a gift in honor of the AG’s first twenty years on August 5 – a regulation implementing the group’s new rules. In addition to the control list and technical note revisions explained above, the BIS rule updates the Export Administration Regulations to reflect a new AG participant (Ukraine), the fact that the tiny Pacific island nation of Niue has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and a new name for the largest part of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Substantial Tightening of Chemical/Biological Controls



By: Scott Gearity

Without formally requesting comments, BIS on April 14 published a rule substantially increasing export restrictions on several items subject to controls for chemical or biological weapons reasons (CB). This regulation comes only two weeks after a March 30 rule expanding the scope of CB catch-all controls to include members of the Australia Group (AG), the multilateral group which seeks to limit the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Steven Goldman, director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, first alerted the exporting community to the prospect of the new rule in a January 27 meeting of the Materials Technical Advisory Committee (MTAC). (This is as good a time as any to remind folks to be sure to read the meeting minutes of the TACs related to your business for all sorts of interesting nuggets, at least from those committees which deign to hold their discussions in open session and bother to publish minutes at all.)


More Countries Subjected to Chemical and Biological Weapon Catch-All Rules



By: Scott Gearity

The last in a Herculean series of March rulemaking efforts by BIS came on the second to last day of the month – an expansion of the scope of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) end-user and end-use controls to cover every country in the world.

These CBW prohibitions are one flavor of the catch-all controls encompassed within the EAR.  Even when an item would not ordinarily require an export license to be shipped to a particular destination, the exporter is obliged to seek a license from BIS if he knows that the item will be used in the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of CBW.

Similar end-use and end-user restrictions are in place on nuclear, rocket, UAV, and maritime nuclear propulsion activities (see EAR Part 744).

The March 30 regulation widens the scope of these controls by eliminating the exemption to them for members of the Australia Group (AG), the informal international arrangement that seeks to limit the proliferation of CBW-related materials and technology.  Now US exporters will need to scrutinize orders from AG countries such as the Belgium, South Korea, and Sweden for CBW end-users and end-use with the same due diligence they have long been required to exercise when it came to the rest of the world.